



Louisiana Department of
Transportation and Development
Emergency Operations Plan

March 2014

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PROMULGATION STATEMENT

Transmitted herewith is the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development's (DOTD) Emergency Operations Plan. This plan supersedes any previous Emergency Operations Plans promulgated for this purpose. This plan provides a framework in which the Department can plan and perform its functions during a disaster or national emergency.

Authority and responsibility for direction and control of the resources of the Department, when operating as members of the State's Emergency Preparedness organization, is an integral part of this basic plan.

This plan is in accordance with existing Federal and State statutes and understandings of the various sections of the Department involved. It has been concurred in by the Secretary of DOTD. It will be reviewed and recertified annually. All recipients are requested to advise the Emergency Operations Director of any recommended changes which might result in the improvement or increase in usefulness of this plan.

Approved: *Sherri H. Lebas* Date: 4/15/14
Sherri Lebas, Secretary

Approved: *Eric Kalivoda* Date: 3/31/14
Eric Kalivoda, Deputy Secretary

Approved: *Kirk Gallien* Date: 3/28/14
Kirk Gallien, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Operations

Approved: *Richard E. Swan* Date: 4/15/14
Richard Swan, Emergency Operations Director

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) is responsible for the transportation infrastructure in the State of Louisiana and the movement of citizens, pets, and critical supplies during an emergency. This Emergency Operations Plan identifies the organizational structure and responsibilities for DOTD during an emergency.

The DOTD Emergency Operations Plan affects all DOTD employees who are responsible to execute tasks that support DOTD's Emergency Operations when there is an emergency or disaster.

The Emergency Operations Plan would be implemented when conditions exist that require its implementation or when directed by the Secretary or Secretary's designated representative. DOTD will implement the Emergency Operations Plan by contacting key leaders and staff with responsibilities within the plan. Key leaders and staff would notify subordinate personnel who have emergency responsibilities.

The Emergency Operations Plan is a component of DOTD's response effort. It is intended to be complimentary to other policies, plans, and procedures as a response using a multi-hazard approach. The successful implementation of the Emergency Operations Plan will ensure DOTD is capable of maintaining a high level of preparedness, response, and recovery.

INTRODUCTION

The Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development's (DOTD) All Hazards Emergency Operations Plan (herewith referred to as Plan) identifies policies, responsibilities and procedures for emergency operations. This plan will cover actions before, during and after disasters/emergencies, both natural and technological.

The events of September 11, 2001 have increased the responsibilities of DOTD for emergency response. In the past the transportation infrastructure maintained by DOTD has been affected by hazardous events. Hurricanes, chemical spills, accidental damage to bridges, etc. are hazards that DOTD responds to. The events of September 11th required DOTD to assume a more proactive role in preventing attacks aimed at crippling the transportation infrastructure. A DOTD Vulnerability Assessment has been developed to identify measures that DOTD can take in meeting its responsibilities relative to terrorist attacks directed at the State's transportation infrastructure. The Assessment is included as part of this document.

Under the 2009 State Emergency Operations Plan, DOTD is assigned as the lead agency for Emergency Support Function (ESF)-1 Transportation and Emergency Support Function (ESF)-3 Public Works and Engineering. ESF-1 involves the coordination of all modes of emergency transportation. Transportation in emergencies consists of the movement of people, household pets, and critical supplies. ESF-3 involves the pre-staging of assets in preparation for contra-flow, damage assessment of state owned roads and facilities, and debris clearance and removal off of public lands and state and federal waterways, roadways and bridges. ESF-3 responsibilities also include the coordination of the maintenance and repair of state flood control works, emergency ice and snow removal, and the coordination of the evaluation and repair of coastal and watershed erosion.

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In addition, DOTD also provides support to other ESF's depending on the nature of the emergency and the type of support required. Specifically, DOTD supports the following ESF's: ESF-2 Communications, ESF-4 Firefighting, ESF-5 Emergency Management, ESF-7 Resource Support, ESF-8 Public Health and Medical Services, ESF-9 Search and Rescue, ESF-10 Oil Spill, Hazardous Materials and Radiological, ESF-11 Agriculture, ESF-13 Public Safety and Security, ESF-14 Community Recovery, Mitigation and Economic Stability, and ESF-15 Emergency Public Information.

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I. PURPOSE, SCOPE, SITUATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. Purpose:

The Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) provides a framework for response to an emergency or disaster. It is an all hazards approach that provides organizational structure, responsibilities, expected actions for DOTD and supporting agencies, and procedures for the DOTD Emergency Operations Center (EOC) during events with or without advanced warning.

B. Scope:

The scope of the Emergency Operations Plan is to ensure that DOTD personnel can respond to a disaster or event within the guidelines of supporting plans and policies. The Plan is applicable to all participants in the Plan and agencies supporting DOTD's Emergency Support Functions.

C. Situations:

1. DOTD is responsible for the construction of and maintenance of approximately 16,000 miles of highways that are in the Federal and State Highway System, approximately 8,000 bridge structures, and 102 movable bridges within the state system.
2. In Louisiana, flooding is a common emergency due to high volumes of rainfall and/or the frequent high tides generated by the Gulf of Mexico. Flooding can inundate roadways making them impassable, and can affect the structural integrity of bridges causing them to be closed to traffic. High winds associated with tropical storms and hurricanes can cause the closing of elevated roadways, bridges, movable bridges, and ferries.
3. DOTD is comprised of nine districts and a headquarters staff employing approximately 4,000 people. DOTD has personnel, equipment and supplies in each District that are used in the construction and maintenance of the Highway System. During disaster/emergency situations, the DOTD Emergency Operations Center will participate in the coordination of activities and the determination of policy when warranted. DOTD's Headquarters and Districts will also cooperate with other emergency response agencies on a continuous and timely basis when an emergency is declared. Where relevant, this will include coordination with states bordering Louisiana.
4. DOTD has established a fully functional Emergency Operations Center to support its emergency responsibilities. The Operations Center consists of the Traffic Management Center, the Call Center, the ESF-1 Branch and the ESF-3 Branch. All of these components have implementing procedures.

D. Assumptions:

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1. There is low probability of a terrorist attack on the state's transportation infrastructure; however DOTD shares responsibility for national security by protecting the state's transportation infrastructure.
2. DOTD's emergency responsibilities are primarily for natural and technological emergencies/disasters.
3. Most emergency response activities performed by the department will parallel its day-to-day functions with the exception of emergency transportation which is assigned to the department under ESF-1.
4. This emergency operations plan is an all hazards plan. Planning efforts are made as general as possible to ensure flexibility in response to any type of event.
5. Local jurisdictions will not request assistance unless all local resources have been exhausted.
6. Day-to-day functions that do not contribute to the emergency may be suspended or redirected for the duration of the emergency.
7. The State of Louisiana and each State Department uses National Incident Management Systems (NIMS), Incident Command System (ICS), and the Unified Command System (UCS) to manage all types of incidents.
8. The DOTD Emergency Operations Center (EOC) will be operational and the focal point of DOTD's response to these disasters or emergencies.

II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. General. It is important to understand that DOTD follows a protocol of centralized planning and decentralized execution.

1. The Emergency Operations plan is coordinated from the DOTD Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The four branches are located in DOTD EOC at 1212 East Highway Dr., Baton Rouge, LA 70802.

The Operations Center has four main branches, each with its own operations and responsibilities. Together these branches serve as components of the DOTD EOC. The main functions of the DOTD EOC are to support ESF-1 and ESF-3 operations and DOTD district offices in the execution of missions. The four branches have implementing procedures that are supplements to the DOTD Operations Plan.

2. Call-up of department personnel will be in accordance with prescribed departmental policy. All personnel will report to their pre-designated locations unless otherwise directed by their supervisor at the time they are

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- notified of the emergency. Pre-designation of duties and responsibilities will facilitate a reduction in response time.
3. The Emergency Operations Plan is the overview of the responsibilities of DOTD, the Emergency Operations Center, and the Emergency Operations Section. The details of emergency operations for DOTD are covered as supplements, annexes, and attachments.
 4. Emergency Action Levels are adopted from the State Emergency Operations Plan in order to maintain consistency.
 - a. Level IV – Normal departmental operations are ongoing. DOTD staffing is in accordance with authorized agency manning levels.
 - b. Level III – Events involve a potential or actual threat to the safety and welfare of the people in a threatened area. DOTD’s Emergency Operations personnel will monitor the situation and place appropriate personnel on standby or alert.
 - c. Level II – Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an imminent or actual major impact on the safety of the people in a stricken area(s). Depending on the nature of the event, DOTD may activate its EOC along with the appropriate personnel and provide representatives to the State EOC, if requested.
 - d. Level I – Events are in progress which require response activities. DOTD EOC will be at the appropriate staffing level.
 5. Terminology will be consistent with State and Federal government terminology.
 - a. Natural Disaster (National Weather Service)
 - (1) Watch
 - (2) Warning
 - (3) Impact
 - (4) Recovery
 - b. Fixed Nuclear Facility (NRC/FEMA)
 - (1) Unusual Event
 - (2) Alert
 - (3) Site Area Emergency

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(4) General Emergency

- B. DOTD Emergency Operations consist of five operations that are department wide. These five operations may overlap and at times are simultaneous. The steps below generally describes these operations.
1. Pre-mobilization. Pre-mobilization is initiated when emergency response resources are alerted to a possible activation. It is continuous until all resources have started to mobilize.
 - a. The Implementing Procedures for the affected branch in the DOTD EOC will go into effect when DOTD is activated in response to an emergency or disaster.
 - b. Plans and procedures will be reviewed and emergency contact information is verified.
 - c. When an impending emergency or disaster situation is recognized, the need for DOTD support will be analyzed.
 - d. Coordination will be made with public and private partners to ensure operational readiness.
 - e. DOTD personnel may be placed on standby or instructed to report.
 2. Mobilization. Mobilization is initiated when the first resource is moved or staged in preparation for operations and concludes when all resources are staged for or engaged in operations.
 - a. Upon decision by the Unified Command, contracts and MOUs, and agreements are activated and resources are being procured.
 - b. Resources are moved or staged in preparation for operations. Resources include equipment, supplies, or personnel.
 3. Operations. The Operations phase is initiated when the first resource is engaged in meeting mission requirements and concludes when all resources have been disengaged from operations
 - a. DOTD will activate the DOTD EOC where execution of all mission assignments will take place when the State EOC is activated or the DOTD Secretary instructs the EOC to activate. Support agency representatives will be present at the DOTD EOC as required.
 - c. Communication will be established between the DOTD EOC and field personnel.
 - d. Operations in support of DOTD ESF missions will commence.

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4. Demobilization. Demobilization is taking actions to efficiently remove or reduce assets being used. Demobilization normally occurs over a designated period of time but can be executed as a singular event. Demobilization is initiated when assets are disengaged from missions to process to return to their origin. It concludes when all assets have been returned to their origin.
5. Recovery. Recovery has two parts: Cost Recovery and Operational Recovery. Cost Recovery is initiated for cost incurred from operations when the first resource is disengaged from operations with the intent of terminating operations. Cost Recovery procedures begin during pre-mobilization, are continuous during operations to consolidate and collect information for reimbursement, and ends when reimbursement has been completed. Operational recovery concludes when all personnel and resources have been returned to its origin, deactivated, and prepared for future mobilization.
 - a. Upon completion of assigned missions, the DOTD Emergency Operations Director will direct deactivation of the DOTD EOC following the cessation of all operations and the compilation of all records.

III. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

During activation the Department of Transportation and Development is organized to support the response effort. Dependent upon the situation, other state agencies and volunteer groups will participate in the response effort.

- A. DOTD Executive Staff
 1. General Staff
 - a. Provide guidance and make policy decisions for DOTD's response to a disaster or emergency
 - b. Coordinate the release of Emergency Public Information with the Public Information Officer in the State Emergency Operations Center
 2. Command Staff
 - a. Make policy decisions and oversee operations
 - b. Coordinate actions with other state agencies and adjoining State Departments of Transportation as required
- B. DOTD Emergency Operations Center

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1. ESF-1 Branch
 - a. Provides for and coordinates available transportation resources and expertise in an emergency or disaster for assisted transportation.
 - b. Coordinates with the Emergency Operations Director and DOTD ESF-1 Lead at the State EOC
 - c. Coordinate the use of resources with the Districts.

2. ESF-3 Branch
 - a. Provides for and coordinates public works activities such as contra-flow, debris management, and damage assessment
 - b. Coordinates with the Emergency Operations Director and DOTD ESF-3 Lead at the State EOC
 - c. Coordinate the use of resources with the Districts

3. Traffic Management Center
 - a. Functions as an information hub for the department on the status of the highway infrastructure in the state.
 - b. Verifies information coming in and leaving the center.
 - c. Where possible, provide real time information concerning roadway traffic volumes on State Emergency Evacuation Routes to appropriate entities.
 - d. Provides real time information on the status of the highway infrastructure to the Call Center, and both the ESF-1 and ESF-3 EOCs.

4. Call Center

Provides timely information to the public concerning the status of the highway infrastructure in the state.

C. Emergency Operations Section

1. Maintain Emergency Operations Center for 24-hour departmental response capability
2. Activate and coordinate staffing of the DOTD Emergency Operations Center
3. Coordinate with the bordering states of Mississippi and Texas on contra-flow

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4. Maintain a communications capability with the State Emergency Operations Center and with the Districts
5. Develop and execute emergency operations plans
6. Collect and maintain records for cost recovery, and document the expenditures of resources

D. Headquarters Staff

1. Provide liaison officers to the State EOC
2. Staff the LSP Traffic Control Center
3. Staff the DOTD Emergency Operations Center
4. Provide personnel to staff field liaison positions and vehicle staging area positions throughout the state
5. Provide personnel to staff Emergency Information Center and Call Center

E. District Headquarters. The actual performance of ESF-1 and ESF-3 missions are conducted by the Districts.

1. District Leadership

- a. Implement guidance and policy decisions from Executive Staff for DOTD's response to a disaster or emergency
- b. Make policy decisions and supervise operations in the District
- c. Coordinate actions with other state agencies and adjoining Departments of Transportation Districts as required
- d. Provide leadership and management for emergency operations within the District. The ADA for Operations is the District Lead for ESF-3 missions, and the ADA for Engineering is the District Lead for ESF-1 missions.
- e. Document the expenditures of resources.

2. District Staff

- a. Maintain and operate 24 hour response capability
- b. Adjustment to signal controllers to minimize damage from storms

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- c. Secure movable bridges when wind speeds reach 39 MPH. Bridges will be open for vehicle traffic to facilitate evacuation and closed to marine traffic
- d. Secure ferryboats and large equipment and materials that could be blown about, float away or be damaged by floodwaters
- e. Coordinate with LSP in determining the closure of elevated roadways or bridges due to unsafe conditions
- f. Debris clearance and removal and appoint District level Debris Managers
- g. Emergency repairs
- h. Assessment of damage to highways and structures affecting their usability
- i. Provision of barricades for routing of evacuation traffic and for road closings
- j. Provision of signage for routing of evacuation traffic
- k. Adjustment of traffic signals on evacuation routes to increase roadway capacity
- l. Use of Traffic Management Centers for traffic operations and information support
- m. Use of ITS type devices (variable message signs, 511 Traveler Information System) for provision of information to the evacuating public
- n. Provision of real time traffic volume data during evacuations
- o. Provision of general roadway information to the media for public distribution
- p. Clearance of roadways and bridges and repairs to traffic signals and signs to allow reentry to evacuated areas
- q. Communicate and coordinate with Parish Offices of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
- r. Develop and maintain Emergency Operations Plan
- s. Maintain communications capability with the DOTD Emergency Operations Center

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- t. Provide personnel to staff field liaison positions and vehicle staging area positions throughout the state
- u. Districts 02, 62, 61, 03, and 07 will provide signage, barricades, personnel, etc. in the event contra-flow is implemented

IV. DIRECTION AND CONTROL

The Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Development is responsible for overall direction and control of emergency response efforts. The Assistant Secretary of Operations will represent the Secretary in the Secretary's absence.

The Emergency Operations Director oversees the overall operations of the DOTD EOC and the emergency response effort. Each branch has a supervisor or lead that manages the branch.

V. CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS

Succession, alternate facilities, and vital records are addressed in the DOTD Continuity of Operations Plan. The execution of the Essential Functions described in the COOP will be the responsibility of the office in which they are assigned. The response to the emergency will be in accordance with existing procedures.

VI. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. Agreements and Understandings

DOTD has entered into Agreements and Memorandums of Understanding for needed resources to meet its responsibilities under the State Emergency Operations Plan.

B. Emergency Purchasing

During an emergency/disaster, administrative rules and procedures may be suspended or relaxed. See PPM No. 38 for the Department's policy on Emergency Purchases.

C. Records and Reports

Records of expenditures and obligations in emergency operations must be maintained. Narrative and log-type records of response actions are also maintained.

The DOTD Emergency Operations Director, The ESF Leads, and affected Districts will maintain a daily record of emergency activities. The records will contain the time of activation and termination of the Operations Center, the principal events that occur, and the use of DOTD resources during an emergency/disaster. Use of resources should include manpower, materials,

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supplies, and equipment that are used only because of the emergency situation. Records of road and bridge closures, and closure of ferry service indicating the time of closure and the reason should be maintained.

VII. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE

The Emergency Operations Director is responsible for the development of emergency plans and procedures. The Emergency Operations Plan is updated as necessary, but at least yearly, prior to hurricane season. Updates may also occur as a result of actual events or exercises.

Emergency response personnel will participate in required training and exercises. The Emergency Operations Director will establish a training program for response staff which reflects appropriate levels of training for each position.

A post event evaluation will be conducted each time the Emergency Operations Center is activated. The evaluation will be used to identify needed changes in procedures, staffing, operations, etc., and to identify additional training needs.

VIII. AUTHORITIES, REFERENCES, AND SUPPLEMENTS

A. Authorities

1. Executive Order No. KBB-2006-34 13
2. 2009 State Emergency Operations Plan
3. DOTD Maintenance Manual, Rev. 1991
4. DOTD Policy and Procedure Memorandum No. 38 – Emergency Purchases
5. DOTD Policy and Procedure Memorandum No. 36 – Security Procedures in the Baton Rouge Headquarters Complex

B. References

1. District Emergency Operations Plans

C. Related Documents

1. ESF-1 Implementing Procedures
2. ESF-3 Implementing Procedures
3. Emergency Information Branch Implementing Procedures
4. Call Center Implementing Procedures


**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT
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5. Continuity of Operations Plan


X. ANNEXES AND ATTACHMENTS

Attachment 1, Emergency Operations Organizational Chart
Attachment 2, Floor Plans
Attachment 3, District Locations
Annex A, Vulnerability Assessment

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



ORGANIZATIONAL CHART




--- Communication
 ----- Command

DOTD EOC FLOOR PLAN



DOTD ANNEX
FIRST FLOOR NORTH

DOTD EOC ESF-1 BRANCH FLOOR PLAN



DOTD EOC ESF-1 BRANCH FLOOR PLAN

Site Staffing POC Board

Opns Officer
DOTDESF1
 225 379-2529

Document Specialist DOTDESF1 225-379-2542	Host State Lead DOTDESF1 225-379-2541
Web EOC Specialist DOTDESF1 225-379-2543	Information LNO DOTDESF1 225-379-1162

DCFS DFCS.EOCDOTDTC 225-242-4604	DCFS DFCS.EOCDOTDTC 225-242-4602
DCFS Mngr DFCS.EOCDOTDTC 225-242-4606	

Objective Board

DOTD ESF-1 BRANCH SEATING CHART

FAX 225-379-2558

Position@la.gov

Bus Accountability Board

Lead Tracker DOTDTracker 225-379-2540	Tracker DOTDTracker 225-379-2561
IP 225 388-0440 ext 3556	
VSA Tracker DOTDESF1 225-379-2567	Tracker DOTDTracker 225-379-2537
	Tracker DOTDTracker 225-379-2541

Mission Board

DOE Rep DOTDDOELNO 225-379-2569	DHH Rep DOTDDHHLNO 225-379-2568
IP 225 388-0440 ext 3553	
Vendor 225-379-2566	Vendor 225-379-2565

Vendor Board

DOTD EOC ESF-1 BRANCH FLOOR PLAN

ESF-3 Branch

DOTD ESF-3 BRANCH
SEATING CHART
FAX 225-379-2584
Position@la.gov

Logistics Coordinator
ESF3Lead
225-379-1572

Report Specialist
DOTDReports
225-379-1562

Report Specialist
DOTDReports
225-379-2565


Debris Manager
ESF3Lead
225-379-2566

Visitor
225-379-2564

ESF-3 Ops Officer
ESF3Lead
225-379-2567

DOTD EOC ESF-1 BRANCH FLOOR PLAN

Call Center



DISTRICT ADDRESSES**DISTRICT CONTACT INFORMATION**

District 02	1440 US Hwy 90 Bridge City, LA 70094	504-437-3100
District 03	428 Hugh Wallis Rd. Lafayette, LA 70502	337-262-6100
District 04	3339 Industrial Dr. Bossier City, LA 71112	318-549-8300
District 05	8010 Desiard Rd. Monroe, LA 71211	318-342-0100
District 07	5827 Hwy 90 E Lake Charles, LA 70601	337-437-9100
District 08	3300 MacArthur Dr. Alexandria, LA 71301	318-561-5100
District 58	6217 Hwy 15 S Chase, LA 71324	318-412-3100
District 61	8100 Airline Hwy. Baton Rouge, LA 70815	225-231-4100
District 62	685 N. Morrison Blvd. Hammond, LA 70401	985-375-0100

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**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT**

INTRODUCTION

The events of 9/11 have changed the requirements for emergency operations at state level transportation departments in the United States. The possibility of attacks against transportation infrastructure by terrorists is now an element that must be addressed in the emergency operations plans for state Departments of Transportation.

The Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) has an All Hazards Emergency Response Plan in place. This plan, however, is focused on non-terrorist types of events such as natural disasters, e.g. hurricanes, and incidents such as accidental chemical releases from industrial sites. DOTD responsibilities are defined for such events. In general the DOTD plays a support role to the primary emergency response agencies such as the police and fire departments during these events.

The terrorist threat requires the revision of the role the DOTD will have in addressing a terrorist incident. While the DOTD will still have a supporting role, there are some proactive measures that can be taken. An important measure is the identification of key assets in the state's infrastructure maintained by the DOTD. This is necessary to raise awareness of potential vulnerability of these assets to terrorist threats. This is done through a vulnerability assessment. The objective of the assessment is to identify key segments in the transportation infrastructure system and to determine what actions that can be taken to reduce the potential threat to them.

It is recognized that the DOTD is not a police or law enforcement agency and thus does not have the resources to identify threats based on potential actions of terrorist organizations. The DOTD does have the ability to identify key elements in the transportation system and the impact to the system of losing a key element. The assessment of vulnerability in terms of the ease of targeting a key transportation element and eliminating it is not one the DOTD is qualified to make. Therefore the focus of this vulnerability assessment is on identifying key links based on parameters that relate to their function in the overall transportation system. A second objective is identifying the actions that can be taken by the DOTD to support law enforcement and other related agencies charged with the responsibility of addressing the terrorist threat.

The DOTD transportation assets can be segregated into four general categories. The first is infrastructure. This includes roads, bridges, overpasses, tunnels, etc. The second category is facilities and includes assets such as maintenance yards, weigh stations, headquarters and district buildings, etc. The third category is equipment. Equipment includes communications systems, signal and control systems, ITS systems, etc. The fourth category is personnel. This includes employees, contractors, vendors, and visitors.

In assessing vulnerability it is necessary to determine what assets are critical to the mission of the DOTD. Assets in each of the above categories provide support to the transportation mission of the DOTD. This vulnerability assessment will focus on the most critical assets necessary to support the DOTD's mission of providing mobility to the State's citizens.

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VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT**

The highway infrastructure is the core asset of the DOTD transportation system. The loss of a segment of the highway system impacts citizens, economic development and in some cases other transportation modes directly and indirectly. The impact of the loss of a key segment is immediate and the duration of the impact on the transportation system can be long term possibly exceeding one year. Based on levels of usage, access provided to critical assets, and the difficulty of replacement, certain segments of the highway system are more critical than other segments. The vulnerability assessment identifies those segments that are most critical to the efficient operation of the transportation system.

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VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

EVALUATION CRITERIA

There are many criteria that can be applied in the identification of critical assets in the highway system. The criteria to be applied also change depending on the general category of asset being evaluated. As previously discussed the DOTD has established its highway infrastructure as the priority asset to be evaluated in the vulnerability assessment. Within the highway infrastructure there are also assets that are more critical than others in terms of the number of persons affected, the difficulty of replacement, impact to commerce, etc. Because of its numerous waterways the Louisiana highway system is particularly dependent on major bridge structures. These critical structures are present on all classes of roadways. Generally, structures that cross major waterways, or water bodies are on interstate, US highways or major Louisiana state routes. These routes tend to have higher volumes of traffic relative to other routes and the structures tend to be more complex because of the larger size of the waterways that are crossed.

Replacement of these types of structures is very expensive and requires a significant amount of time. In addition, many of these structures bridge navigable waterways and have the potential to interrupt waterborne commerce if their destruction were to create an impediment to navigation. Some of the structures also provide for rail crossing of waterways and thus are intermodal in their function. This increases the value of the structure making it even more critical in the transportation system. The DOTD has chosen to focus on these bridge structures because of the critical role they play in the highway transportation system.

There are approximately 8,000 bridges in the Louisiana highway system. While each of these structures can be a potential terrorist target, the probability is that those structures that are the most critical to the system are high potential targets and thus need to be identified. The process of identifying the most critical bridge structures utilizes the DOTD bridge inventory for basic data.

The first step in the identification of critical bridges is to identify all bridge structures that are one hundred feet or more in length. These bridges because of their length are more difficult to replace and generally are crossing major bodies of water (rivers, lakes, wetlands, etc). The DOTD bridge inventory data is used to provide a list of bridge structures meeting these criteria. The bridges meeting these criteria are organized by DOTD district for further rating.

The bridges in each district are then assessed using vulnerability evaluation criteria established by the DOTD identify the most critical structures. The evaluation criteria focus on six general factors to identify critical bridges.

The first factor utilized is the average daily traffic (ADT) crossing the bridge structure. The level of traffic that uses a facility is a core indicator of its value in the transportation system. The higher traffic levels logically indicate a greater need for the specific highway segment than for those with lower ADTs. The first step in the process for assigning a traffic value to a structure is to rank structures in each DOTD district by their ADT level. This provides an indication of the value of each structure relative to other structures in the district. Points are then assigned to structures based on their ADT ranking. Structures that are in the top five ADTs in the district

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receive five points. Those structures that rank six to ten receive three points. Structures that have ADTs not in the top ten of the district receive one point.

The second factor examined in identifying critical structures is the presence of an available alternative. In some cases there are alternative bridge structures that can be utilized to cross a body of water should a structure be lost. There are two items that are considered in evaluating this factor. The first is the distance to the alternative facility. If an alternative facility were forty miles from the facility being evaluated, the loss impact of the primary facility would be greater than if the alternate facility were five miles away. Simply in terms of travel time and fuel expenditure the impact is greater when the alternate facility is farther away. The DOTD bridge inventory data includes a field that provides the distance to an alternate facility for bridge structures. This value is used in determining the point assignment for this criterion. For a facility with an alternate greater than twenty miles away five points are assigned. Alternates that are eleven to twenty miles away receive a point assignment of three. Alternates that are ten or less miles away are assigned one point.

The second item that is considered under available alternate is the level of service of the alternate facility. If traffic is diverted to an alternate facility that has a low level of service, the impact on detouring traffic will be greater relative to travel time and travel costs. The DOTD Summary Log of the DOTD Needs System provides the level of service for all State and US highways in the State. The level of service on a logical alternate facility for the structure being evaluated is determined from the Summary Log. Alternate facilities with a level of service E or F are assigned a point value of five. Alternates with a level of service C or D are assigned a point value of three. A level of service of A or B results in a point assignment of one.

The third factor examined is the estimated time that it would take to replace a facility that is lost. This is a subjective evaluation in that the extent of the damage to a facility cannot be determined before a terrorist incident. Damages could range from very minor to very extensive. Although difficult to determine objectively, the potential replacement time for a structure is a critical element in addressing the impact of its loss. For this reason the potential replacement time frame is included in the evaluation of structures.

The DOTD Bridge inventory data is used for guidance in determining the points assigned for replacement time frame. The inventory data includes an estimated replacement cost for each structure and the total length of the structure. As replacement cost and length of structure increase it is assumed that the time frame necessary for replacement increases. These two inventory elements are used to guide the assignment of points for this evaluation factor.

Replacement time frames that exceed one year are assigned a point value of five. Estimated replacement time between six months and one year is assigned a value of three. If a structure can be replaced in less than six months it receives a point value of one.

The fourth factor considered is the potential impact on a second or third transportation mode should a structure be damaged. Some bridge structures share the bridge with a rail crossing. This is particularly true for major river crossings. Where this situation occurs the loss of the bridge structure would impact not only the highway mode, but also the rail mode. This would increase the disruption to the State's transportation infrastructure thus raising the critical level of

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the structure. Bridge structures that support an additional mode are assigned five points under the secondary mode factor.

Major bridge structures often cross waterways that carry commercial water traffic. Typically the larger the bridge structure, the larger the waterway that is crossed and the higher the level of water borne traffic. If in damaging a bridge structure, water borne commerce is reduced or eliminated because of debris in the water channel, the impact of the loss of the bridge structure is magnified because of its impact on waterborne commerce. It is possible that a bridge structure could be damaged and not affect water traffic. Again this is a subjective measure, but the presence of the potential for impact to waterborne commerce is considered sufficient to increase the critical rating of a bridge structure. Where a bridge structure crosses a navigable waterway that carries waterborne commerce a point assignment of three is made to account for the indirect impact on a secondary mode.

A fifth factor considered is the economic impact of the loss of a facility. The impact being considered is the loss of commerce due to the restriction of movement over the highway system and not the dollar impact of replacing a facility. This is a difficult factor to measure because the loss of any facility will result in some economic impact. To facilitate consistent evaluation of this factor two considerations are made. The first considers the level of truck traffic using a facility. High levels of truck traffic correspond to a high level of goods movement over a facility. Loss of a facility with a high level of truck traffic is an economic impact in that the cost of delivery of goods is increased. The DOTD maintains data on truck traffic as a percentage of ADT on the highway system. Truck traffic that exceeds 20% is a relatively high percentage of truck traffic on a roadway. When evaluating facilities, those that have truck percentages of greater than 20% are assigned a point value of two.

A second consideration of economic impact is a condition where a highway facility provides the only access to an intermodal facility. Intermodal facilities are key in the overall transportation system in that they facilitate the exchange of goods between transportation modes. Loss of highway access to such a facility seriously compromises the effectiveness of the facility. Although this situation is not common, when it does occur a point value of five is assigned to reflect its importance to the transportation system.

The final factor considered is special conditions that may exist. There are highway structures that serve a very specific purpose not addressed in the preceding criteria. Examples are a route that is critical to emergency response, or military movement of men and equipment. Five points are assigned when this type of condition exists. This is a subjective evaluation, but is considered critical to the overall priority of a structure.

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KEY BRIDGE STRUCTURES IN DOTD DISTRICTS

The process for evaluating bridge structures and their value to the transportation infrastructure system was applied to the inventory of bridges for DOTD Districts 02, 03, 04, 05, 07, 08, 58, 61, and 62. In each District the top five ranking bridge structures have been identified. In some Districts there may be more than five structures listed because of equal rankings for multiple bridges.

It should be noted that these are considered key bridge structures because they serve a higher volume of the traveling public and/or support economic development more than other structures. This does not mean that other bridges in a district are not possible targets for terrorism. The loss of any bridge in the system will impact the system the only difference between bridges being the magnitude and duration of impact. These bridges have been identified because they are those whose loss would have greater and longer impacts on the highway system. Because of this they will receive more attention relative to security, but all facilities will receive attention. The level of attention varies relative to the potential level of impact on the system.

The following summarizes the results of the bridge vulnerability analysis for each DOTD District.

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District 02

Parishes in District 02 are Jefferson, Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemine, St. Charles, and Terrebonne. Key bridges identified in this district are as follows:

<u>Bridge</u>	<u>Route</u>	<u>Parish</u>	<u>Control Section No.</u>
Huey P. Long	US 90	Jefferson	006-01
Intracoastal Canal @ Larose	LA 1	Lafourche	064-05
Crescent City Connection	US 90B	Orleans	283-08
Mississippi River	US 90B	Orleans	283-08
Gulf Outlet Canal	LA 47	Orleans	148-02
Hale Boggs	I-310	St. Charles	450-36
High Rise	I-10	Orleans	450-90
Harvey Canal	US 90B	Jefferson	283-09

The bridges in the New Orleans area carry the highest volumes of traffic in the State. They are particularly valuable for circulation in the greater New Orleans region because of the lack of alternative routes. The Huey P. Long Bridge is a very critical bridge because it includes the only rail crossing of the Mississippi River south of Baton Rouge.

In addition to the bridges identified in District 02, the District has three tunnels. These tunnels are the Belle Chasse Tunnel, the Harvey Tunnel, and the Houma Tunnel. The tunnels are considered key infrastructure in the District because their enclosed structure makes them a potential target where the objective is to harm human life. The three tunnels are listed below.

<u>Tunnel</u>	<u>Route</u>	<u>Parish</u>	<u>Control Section No.</u>
Belle Chase Tunnel	LA 23	Plaquemine	062-02
Harvey Tunnel	US 90B	Jefferson	283-09
Houma Tunnel	LA 3040	Terrebonne	065-30

District 03

District 03 includes the following parishes: Acadia, Evangeline, Iberia, Lafayette, St. Landry, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Vermilion. The following are key bridges in District 03.

<u>Bridge</u>	<u>Route</u>	<u>Parish</u>	<u>Control Section No.</u>
Bayou Beouf	US 90	St. Mary	005-02
Atchafalaya River	I-10	St. Martin	450-06
Atchafalaya Floodway	I-10	St. Martin	450-06
Atchafalaya River	US 190	St. Landry	008-04
Atchafalaya River	LA 182	St. Mary	005-01
Ramos Bayou	US 90	St. Mary	005-01
S. Pacific RR Overpass	US 90	Acadia	003-10

The Atchafalaya River, floodway, and basin dominate the geography in this district. Crossings of the Atchafalaya are limited and thus the bridges that enable crossings are critical to the highway system in this district.

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District 04

Parishes in District 04 are Bienville, Bossier, Caddo, Claiborne, Desoto, Red River, and Webster. Key bridges in the District are as follows:

<u>Bridge</u>	<u>Route</u>	<u>Parish</u>	<u>Control Section No.</u>
Red River	I 20	Bossier	451-02
Red River	US 84	Red River	021-05
Red River	I 220	Bossier	451-31
Drains (4)	I 20	Caddo	451-01
Cross Bayou & Relief	I 20	Caddo	451-01
Bear Creek & Relief	I 20	Bienville	451-04
Leatherman Creek	I 20	Bienville	451-04
Drain	I 20	Bienville	451-04
Caney Creek	I 10	Bienville	451-04
Gilmer Bayou	LA 525	Caddo	097-01
Caddo Lake	LA 1	Caddo	045-01
Red Chute Bayou	US 80	Bossier	001-03
St. Louis Railroad	LA 3	Bossier	044-02

I-20 is the critical roadway in District 04. This route carries high volumes of traffic and a large volume of truck traffic. The I-20 bridge over the Red River is a critical bridge in this District.

District 05

Parishes in District 05 are East Carroll, Jackson, Lincoln, Madison, Morehouse, Ouachita, Richland, Union, and West Carroll.

<u>Bridge</u>	<u>Route</u>	<u>Parish</u>	<u>Control Section No.</u>
Ouachita River	US 80	Ouachita	001-09
Ouachita River	LA 2	Ouachita	070-07
Mississippi River	I 20	Madison	451-09
Ouachita River	I 20	Ouachita	451-06
Bayou Darbonne	LA 33	Union	069-02
Corney Bayou	LA 2	Union	070-04
Cross Bayou	LA 143	Ouachita	315-02

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District 07

Parishes in District 07 are Allen, Beauregard, Calcasieu, Cameron, and Jefferson Davis. Key bridges in the District are as follows:

<u>Bridge</u>	<u>Route</u>	<u>Parish</u>	<u>Control Section No.</u>
Sabine River	I-10	Calcasieu	450-01
Calcasieu River/Prien Lake	I-220	Calcasieu	450-30
Calcasieu River	I-10	Calcasieu	450-91
English Bayou	US 171	Calcasieu	024-01
W. Fork Calcasieu River	US 171	Calcasieu	810-12
Bickham Slough	LA 12	Calcasieu	012-02
Patterson Slough	LA 12	Calcasieu	012-02
Long Slough	LA 12	Calcasieu	012-02
Morman Slough	LA 12	Calcasieu	012-02
Washout Slough	LA 12	Calcasieu	012-02
Ashworth Slough	LA 12	Calcasieu	012-02
Current Slough	LA 12	Calcasieu	012-02
Old River Slough	LA 12	Calcasieu	012-02
Mud Lake	LA 12	Calcasieu	012-02

The I-10 is the critical roadway in District 03 and thus the bridges across the Sabine and Calcasieu Rivers receive high priority. The grouping of bridges on LA 12 is located between the Beauregard/Calcasieu Parish line and the Texas State line in Calcasieu Parish.

District 08

Parishes in District 08 are Avoyelles, Grant, Natchitoches, Rapides, Sabine, Vernon, and Winn. Key bridges in the District are as follows:

<u>Bridge</u>	<u>Route</u>	<u>Parish</u>	<u>Control Section No.</u>
Red River	LA 107	Avoyelles	033-03
KCS Railroad	US 171	Rapides	840-43
Atchafalaya River	LA 1	Avoyelles	052-05
CRI&P Railroad	US 167	Winn	023-04
Young Bayou	LA 6	Natchitoches	034-05
Chatlain Canal	LA 3170	Rapides	840-35
Beaver Creek	LA 112	Rapides	073-03
Hurricane Creek	LA 112	Rapides	073-03
Choctaw Bayou	LA 1	Avoyelles	052-07

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District 58

Parishes in District 58 are Caldwell, Catahoula, Concordia, Franklin, LaSalle, and Tensas. Key bridges in the District are as follows.

<u>Bridge</u>	<u>Route</u>	<u>Parish</u>	<u>Control Section No.</u>
Ouachita River	US 165	Caldwell	015-07
Black River	US 84	Concordia	022-07
Cross Bayou	US 84	Concordia	022-07
Unnamed	US 165	LaSalle	015-05
Chicksaw Creek	US 165	LaSalle	015-05
Black Bayou	US 165	Caldwell	015-06
Hemps Creek	US 84	LaSalle	022-05
Bushley Bayou	LA 124	Catahoula	041-01
Pine Bayou Canal	LA 15	Franklin	026-07
Carroll Bayou	US 65	Concordia	026-03
Mill Pond Creek	US 84	LaSalle	

District 61

District 61 is composed of the following parishes: Ascension, Assumption, East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Iberville, Pointe Coupee, St. James, West Baton Rouge, and West Feliciana. Key bridges identified in this District are as follows:

<u>Bridge</u>	<u>Route</u>	<u>Parish</u>	<u>Control Section No.</u>
Mississippi River	US 190	East Baton Rouge	007-10
Belle River	LA 70	Assumption	232-01
Miss. River @ Grammercy	LA 3213	St. James	434-02
Mississippi River	I-10	E. & W. Baton Rouge	450-090
Pierre Part Bay	LA 70	Assumption	232-01
Little Bayou Pierre Part	LA 70	Assumption	232-01
Bayou Corne	LA 70	Assumption	232-01
Bayou Conway	LA 22	Ascension	266-01
Bayou Plaquemine	LA 1	Iberville	050-06
Intracoastal Canal	LA 1	West Baton Rouge	050-07

The US 190 and I-10 bridges over the Mississippi River are key bridges in this District. The I-10 Bridge is the only interstate system bridge crossing in Louisiana south of I-20 in north Louisiana. It plays a vital role in east/west traffic movement across the southern United States and south Louisiana. The US 190 Bridge while carrying lower volumes of traffic provides a rail crossing of the Mississippi River.

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District 62

Parishes in District 62 include Livingston, St. Helena, St. John, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, and Washington. Key bridges identified in this District are as follows:

<u>Bridge</u>	<u>Route</u>	<u>Parish</u>	<u>Control Section No.</u>
W. Pearl River	I-59	St. Tammany	453-01
W. Pearl River	I-10	St. Tammany	450-18
E. Pearl River	I-10	St. Tammany	450-19
Reserve Relief Canal	I-10	St. John	450-13
Bayou Lacombe	I-12	St. Tammany	454-04
US 51 over I-12	US 51	Tangipahoa	017-04

The key structures in this district are all on or related to the interstate system. The high traffic volumes and the role the interstates play in the overall highway system warrant key designation of these structures.

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STATEWIDE HIGH PRIORITY BRIDGES

The analysis of bridges on a District basis identified bridges at the District level that are key to the highway infrastructure in the respective Districts. On a statewide level these priorities are not necessarily the same because the geographic setting, population, economic development, travel patterns etc. within each District is not equal. It was determined that there is a need to identify priority bridges on a statewide level identifying those that are especially critical to the infrastructure of the state, region, and nation. This will allow the allocation of limited resources to those bridges that are the highest priority in the state.

The interstate system is the backbone of the Louisiana highway system. Interstates provide east west and north south access and are critical to the region and the nation. The interstate system moves the highest volumes of people and goods. The interstate system also has high importance to the military for national defense. For these reasons bridges that are located on the Louisiana interstate system are considered high priority. Only bridges on the primary interstate system that includes I-10, I-20, I-55, and I-59 were considered. Bridges on interstate spurs were not considered.

There are numerous bridges and elevated structures on the state's interstate system but only those that are single structures and not twin structures are identified as high priority bridges. The basis for this prioritization is that both bridges of a twin structure would have to be compromised to effectively eliminate traffic over a facility and this is not as high a probability as a single structure being compromised. The following bridges are those on the interstate system that are identified as high priority.

I-10 Bridges

Sabine River – 450-01
Calcasieu River – 450-91
Atchafalaya River – 450-06
Whiskey Bay Pilot Channel, Atchafalaya River
Mississippi River @ Baton Rouge – 450-09
Industrial Canal, New Orleans High Rise – 450-90
East Pearl River – 450-19

I-20 Bridges

Red River – 451-02
Mississippi River @ Vicksburg – 451-09

I-55 Bridges

Pass Manchac – 452-90

I-59 Bridges

West Pearl – 453-01

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In addition to Interstate system bridges the bridges over the Mississippi River are also considered high priority. These bridges are considered especially critical to the transportation infrastructure system on a national level. There are few crossings of the Mississippi River and because of this the crossings tend to carry higher levels of traffic and be critical to the highway infrastructure on a regional and national level. In addition the bridge lengths, expense and time for replacement, impact on other transportation modes (rail), and the scarcity of alternate crossings result in these bridges having high value in the transportation infrastructure system. The following bridges are those that cross the Mississippi River that were not previously included in the list of interstate bridges.

Mississippi River Crossings

US 84/US 65 @ Vidalia/Natchez
US 190 @ Baton Rouge – 007-10
LA 70 @ Donaldsonville
LA 3213 @ Grammercy – 434-02
I-310 @ Luling – 450-37
US 90 @ New Orleans – 006-01
US 90B @ New Orleans (Twin Bridges) – 283-08

There are some key bridges that are not on the interstate system or crossing the Mississippi River. These may be considered high priority because they provide the only access to a large population area, access to a key economic generator, or to an intermodal terminal. The bridges listed below serve these types of functions in the system. This list is not comprehensive and will be revised as necessary.

Non-interstate/ Non-Mississippi River Crossing Bridges

LA 1 – Intracoastal Canal @ Larose - 064-05
LA 1 – Bayou Lafourche @ Leeville
LA 1 – Intracoastal @ Port Allen

The three tunnels in District 02 are also considered key from a statewide perspective because of their uniqueness in terms of a potential terrorist target. The three tunnels are listed below.

Tunnels

LA 23 – Belle Chase – 062-02
US 90B – Harvey – 283-09
LA 3040 – Houma – 065-30

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OTHER ASSETS

The DOTD manages assets other than the highway infrastructure that support the transportation system. These include equipment, materials, maintenance facilities, weigh stations, rest areas, employee offices and communications systems. These assets while important to the management and operation of the highway system are not critical in the sense that if one of them were lost, the highway system would immediately cease to function. The DOTD does recognize, however, the value of these assets in the long-term operation of the transportation infrastructure and is taken measures to insure their security.

The DOTD gives high priority to the protection of its employees in their working environment. Security measures have been taken to raise security at DOTD office sites. Identification badges, sign in for visitors, presence of security personnel, and video observation are key measures that have been taken to insure the safety of employees. As necessary these measures are reviewed and will be upgraded depending on the potential threat level.

Measures for the protection of DOTD equipment and materials are a part of ongoing DOTD operations. The threat of theft, vandalism or contamination of materials is continually present and thus is addressed. Storage areas are secured and depending on the size and type of equipment and materials stored, security personnel are present during non-office hours.

The DOTD operates signal control and ITS systems as part of the transportation infrastructure. There is little that can be done to protect these assets since they are scattered throughout the highway system. Loss of signals and ITS components is not uncommon due to system failure, electrical outages, damage from vehicular accidents, etc. The DOTD addresses these outages on a daily basis and is prepared to address loss of systems on a large-scale basis. This capability has been shown during the recovery from tropical storms and hurricanes that are common in the Gulf Coast area. The loss of these types of assets does not prohibit use of the highway system. It reduces the capacity of the system because of the lack of operational efficiency, but does not close the system. For these reasons the DOTD does not propose any special security measures related to signal and ITS systems.

There are several types of DOTD facilities that have routine visitation or congregation from highway users. These are the rest areas/visitor centers, and weigh stations. The DOTD works with the appropriate law enforcement agencies in the relevant areas where these facilities are located to provide security. DOTD maintenance personnel that are present are trained to report any unlawful activity that is observed to the appropriate law enforcement authorities.

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HIGH PRIORITY BRIDGE SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES

Bridges that have been identified as high priority in the system will be reviewed to determine what measures can be taken by the DOTD to reduce their vulnerability. Measures will include site layout modifications, and access control/deterrent measures. Local police currently patrols some of the high priority bridges. The appropriate police agency will be notified and advised that the bridge is considered high priority in the system.

The DOTD has identified ten key bridges that need to be monitored by camera. Funding is being sought to install cameras underneath the bridges so that the support structures and waterways in the vicinity of the bridges can be monitored. The signal from these cameras will be accessible to selected agencies via the internet. Camera installation for these bridges has been prioritized in the following order.

Camera Monitored Bridges

- US 90 @ New Orleans – Mississippi River
- US 190 @ Baton Rouge – Mississippi River
- I-10 High Rise @ New Orleans – Industrial Canal
- I-10 @ Baton Rouge – Mississippi River
- I-20 @ Vicksburg – Mississippi River
- I-10 @ East Pearl River
- I-59 @ West Pearl River
- I-10 @ Sabine River
- I-10 @ Whiskey Bay Pilot Channel
- I-10 @ Atchafalaya River

Site layout measures that will be considered include but are not limited to:

- Improved lighting with emergency backup
- Improved lines of sight to critical areas
- Elimination of parking spaces beneath bridges
- Review of storage areas in the vicinity of the bridge
- Access control measures that will be considered include:
- Police patrol and surveillance

Note: Police patrols currently in place on the US 90 Bridge and Crescent City Connection
Mississippi River Bridges in New Orleans

- Elimination of access to critical areas
- Signs with warnings that the area is being monitored
- CCTV coverage of critical areas
- Denied/limited access to inspection platforms
- Removal of abandoned vehicles

The DOTD will coordinate these efforts with local law enforcement agencies to ensure they are consistent with measures the agencies may be taking.

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Security measures that are implemented will be inspected as part of the DOTD's bridge inspection program. This will insure maintenance of the measures. The DOTD will update the effort to improve security at these bridges as new measures are identified by the US Homeland Security Administration or law enforcement agencies.

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DOTD TRAINING

The DOTD does not have a proactive role in the prevention of terrorist's activity. DOTD personnel are not law enforcement officers and are not trained in law enforcement techniques. The approximately 4,000 employees that work for the DOTD do, however, provide an asset in terms of being "eyes and ears" for support of prevention efforts throughout the State's transportation system. Virtually all employees use the highway system daily and if aware of what to look for can be a support resource for law enforcement officials by noting unusual activity and reporting it.

The focus of the DOTD training in the security area is to make employees aware of those things that are not normal, or are unusual and thus should be reported to authorities. Depending on the job activity of the employee, some have more potential to help in this area than others.

The employees that have the most potential to identify suspicious activity on the highway system are those working on the system on a daily basis. This would include maintenance crews, construction personnel, survey personnel, etc. These employees are very aware of the nuances of the system and can easily identify changes that are not normal. Most of these employees are based at the DOTD District level and thus are very familiar with the highway system in their District.

These employees are the highest priority for receiving security related training. As training courses become available these employees will participate in the training. This will raise their level of awareness concerning what is unusual. The employees will also be instructed as to who should be contacted should they observe an activity that needs to be reported. Employees such as these that are in the field working on the highway system daily are considered the front line in DOTD's effort to support law enforcement.

There are other employees that routinely use the highway system to commute to work or go to meetings at other agencies, etc. If informational or training materials aimed at raising employee awareness of unusual activities become available it will be provided to the employees. This will further extend the ability of the DOTD to provide support to law enforcement agencies through system surveillance.